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The Role of Credit Ratings on Capital Structure and Its Speed of Adjustment:  





Using an international dataset, we examine the role of issuers’ credit ratings in explaining 
corporate leverage and the speed with which firms adjust toward their optimal level of 
leverage. We find that, in countries with a more market-oriented financial system, the impact 
of credit ratings on firms’ capital structure is more significant and that firms with a poorer 
credit rating adjust more rapidly. Furthermore, our results show some striking differences in 
the speed of adjusting capital structure between firms rated as speculative- and 
investment-grade, with the former adjusting much more rapidly. As hypothesized, those 
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The Role of Credit Ratings on Capital Structure and Its Speed of Adjustment:  
An International Study 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Until a decade ago, the effect of credit ratings on firms’ capital structure was generally 
neglected in empirical research. This status quo changed in 2006, after Kisgen articulated his 
“credit rating–capital structure hypothesis” in a seminal paper. Since then, studies on the 
relationship between credit ratings and firms’ leverage policies in the US market have 
mushroomed (Byoun, 2011; Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith, 2012; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009; Kisgen, 2009; Mittoo and Zhang, 2010; Tang, 2009). Although the importance 
of credit ratings on firms’ capital structure has been amply documented, the rapidly growing 
literature on differences in corporate capital structure across countries continues to neglect 
credit ratings from the list of determinants (Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal, 2008; Fan, Titman, 
and Twite, 2012; González and González, 2008).
1
 To the best of our knowledge, only one 
study (Huang and Shen, 2015) investigates the effect of changes in credit ratings on firms’ 
capital structure and the speed with which they adjust to an optimal level of leverage in an 
international context. We try to fill this gap by examining the role of credit ratings, especially 
the rating level, on both firms’ capital structure and the speed with which they adjust to an 
optimal level of leverage in the international context, spanning two decades from 1991 to 
2010. We pose three main questions: (1) What is the effect of credit rating levels on firms’ 
leverage? (2) What is the effect of credit rating levels on the speed with which firms adjust 
their capital structure to an optimal level? (3) Do the effects from (1) and (2) depend on the 
financial orientation of a country (bank based vs. market based) in which rated firms are 
based?  
                                                     
1
 This seems surprising, given the documented importance of credit ratings on financing decisions (at least in the 




Unlike previous studies (e.g., Kisgen, 2006), this study explores the role of credit rating 
levels, rather than rating changes or having a credit rating, on capital structure decisions. 
Many surveys (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen, de Jong, and Koedijk, 2004; Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Servaes and Tufano, 2006) explore managers’ concern over the company’s 
credit rating level.
2
 Papers that include credit ratings among the determinants of capital 
structure conducted with respect to the United States offer mixed results. For example, Tang 
(2009) argues that the higher the credit ratings, the higher the firm’s leverage ratio while 
evidence for a negative relation is found in studies by Bougheas, Mizen, and Yalcin (2006), 
Byoun (2011), Frank and Goyal (2009), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Mittoo and Zhang 
(2010), among others.
3
 Our study adds evidence to the debate in an international context. 
Although the literature on dynamic capital structure is rapidly growing, only three studies 
(Faulkender et al., 2012; Huang and Shen, 2015; Kisgen, 2009) directly examine the influence 
of credit ratings on the speed with which firms rebalance their debt ratios to achieve target 
levels. Kisgen (2009) focuses on credit rating changes and finds that rating downgrades make 
firms adjust more rapidly. However, when ratings are upgraded, he finds no significant change 
in companies’ speed of adjustment. Faulkender et al. (2012) compare the speed of adjustment 
of rated and nonrated companies and argue that having a credit rating can “affect leverage 
adjustment speeds so greatly that they can reverse the usual finding … that under-levered 
firms adjust less rapidly than over-levered firms” (p. 643). We add to these studies by 
                                                     
2
 Graham and Harvey (2001), in a survey conducted on US firms’ chief financial officers (CFOs), document that 
the credit rating level is the second-most-important factor (nearly on par with financial flexibility) in financing 
decisions. According to their survey, over 57% of managers consider their company’s level of credit rating very 
important. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) find even stronger evidence for the importance of credit rating levels from 
a survey of European firm managers, in which firms’ credit rating levels are seen as very important by CFOs. 
Brounen, de Jong, and Koedijk (2004), in their survey of European CFOs, find that between 27% and 39% of 
CFOs “always or almost always … choose the appropriate amount of debt” based on their current credit rating 
(p. 95). More recently, Servaes and Tufano (2006), in their worldwide survey of 334 companies, document that 
the largest percentage (60%) of “Firms do not add more debt because they have reached their target and because 
this would lead to a drop in credit ratings” (p. 45). In addition, they find that credit ratings “independent of any 
other factors” are the most important factors in determining firms’ level of debt. They conclude that such results 
“indicate that companies care about the rating, per se. Further work is required by finance theorists to investigate 
why this might be the case” (p. 42). 
3
 For a brief discussion of each of those studies, see Section 2.3. 
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focusing on credit rating levels and their impact on the speed of adjustment of companies 
operating in 19 countries. In addition, we examine the difference between speculative- and 
investment-graded firms’ capital structure adjustment and further validate Kisgen’s (2009) 
findings in an international context. 
Prior research on international capital structure investigates the relation between financial 
orientation and capital structure; however, the empirical studies have mixed findings. For 
example, Antoniou et al. (2008) and Borio (1990) report that German companies (in a 
bank-based economy) are more highly leveraged than Canadian firms (in a market-based 
economy) while Rajan and Zingales (1995) find evidence of the opposite. In addition, the 
existing literature sheds no light on the relationship between credit ratings and capital 
structure and the impact of financial orientation on that relationship. We extend the literature 
by examining the impact of credit ratings on firms’ leverage in 19 countries with different 
financial orientations. 
One potential problem in the studies exploring the effect of the credit rating level on 
capital structure is the simultaneity (or dynamic nature) between credit ratings and corporate 
leverage. When credit rating agencies assess firms’ creditworthiness, they examine the firm’s 
current and past levels of debt. Because the credit rating can be seen as a proxy for the 
probability of default, the higher the company’s leverage, the higher that probability and the 
possibility of a lower credit rating. By contrast, if a firm has a higher credit rating, the firm’s 
cost of debt financing is lower, and thus the managers can borrow at a lower cost and increase 
their leverage in the future. We successfully mitigate this critical issue by selecting and 
employing two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic modeling, 
which was found to be the most suitable in previous literature investigating firms’ dynamic 
capital structure decisions (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008).
4
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 The system GMM procedure developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) can deal 
with the simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity, short panel bias, and a number of other problems that arise 
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Using 17,102 firm-year observations from 19 economies
5
 between 1991 and 2010, this 
paper investigates the impact of the credit rating level on capital structure and the speed of 
that capital structure’s adjustment. The findings can be summarized as follows. First, credit 
ratings are negatively associated with leverage ratios. Firms with a good credit rating may be 
more conservative in their use of debt financing and can issue stock more easily than firms 
with a poor credit rating. Second, we find that firms with a lower credit rating have 
significantly more rapid adjustment in their capital structure than firms with a better credit 
rating; and the effect of credit rating on the speed of adjustment is greater in more 
market-oriented financial systems. Third, the effect of credit rating levels varies 
substantially—that is, the more market oriented the country in which the company is based, 
the stronger the effect stemming from the credit rating, ceteris paribus. 
 This paper makes contributions to the existing literature by investigating the role of 
credit ratings in capital structure and the adjustment speed of capital structure in different 
countries. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to show that poorly rated firms 
have more rapid adjustment in their capital structure than highly rated firms. Two papers in 
the literature are similar to our study. The paper by Kisgen (2006) motivates this study on 
exploring the role of credit rating in capital structure. Our paper differs from Kisgen (2006) in 
that we focus on credit rating levels rather than ratings near a change. As shown above, in 
practice, managers care about credit rating levels; thus it is meaningful to directly test the 
impact of credit ratings on leverage ratios.  
Another paper, by Huang and Shen (2015), also explores the influence of rating changes 
on corporate leverage adjustment in an international context. Our estimates differ from Huang 
and Shen’s (2015) along a number of important dimensions. First, their paper concerns the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
when the difference GMM technique is applied (see Section 3.4).  
5
 The economies include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 




effect of rating changes (i.e., downgrades and upgrades) on changes in corporate leverage 
(adjustment speed); our paper tests the impact of credit rating levels on both the level and the 
adjustment speed of corporate leverage. Additionally, we explore the impact of financial 
architecture in different countries on the relationship between credit ratings and corporate 
leverage, which is not explored in Huang and Shen (2015). Second, Huang and Shen (2015) 
use the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) method whereas this paper employs GMM 




The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the related 
literature. We then develop hypotheses, introduce econometric models, and describe the 
variables and data used. The results are then presented, and their implications for capital 
structure are described in detail. The last section concludes the paper. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Theories of Capital Structure 
We can distinguish among three major strands of studies on capital structure: the 
trade-off theory, the pecking-order theory, and the market-timing theory. The trade-off theory 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) states that a firm’s capital structure is chosen based on the 
idea of achieving an optimal level of leverage. The value-maximizing debt ratio is achieved 
by balancing the costs and benefits of debt financing. On the one hand, leverage can reduce 
corporate taxes. On the other hand, increased leverage incurs the costs of financial distress, 
both direct and indirect (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), and various agency costs (e.g., Jensen, 
1986). Using a sample of Dutch, nonfinancial firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 
de Jong and Van Dijk (2007) find that the trade-off between tax advantage and bankruptcy 
costs determines leverage. According to the pecking-order theory developed by Myers (1984) 
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 OLS assumes that all the independent variables are strictly exogenous. 
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and Myers and Majluf (1984), companies do not aim to achieve a specific debt-equity ratio. 
Rather, because of asymmetric information between managers and investors, firms have a 
preference for internal financing over debt and for debt over equity when raising funds for 
investment. The market-timing theory also eschews the idea of an optimal capital structure. 
Instead, management is more apt to issue equity when stock prices are high and to repurchase 
equity when stock prices are low (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Thus, firms try to minimize the 
cost of financing by timing the market. 
Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) attempt to reconcile the trade-off theory and the 
pecking-order theory using dynamic modeling, in which firms follow the pecking-order 
theory in the short run and the trade-off theory in the long run. Whenever the adjustment costs 
of rebalancing to achieve the optimal level of leverage outweigh the costs of being outside 
this optimum, managers will allow their firm’s leverage to diverge temporarily from it and 
make adjustments only occasionally. Using partial-adjustment models, Huang and Ritter 
(2009), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) document that 
firms rebalance their debt ratio at various speeds of adjustment.  
Recently, a number of researchers conducted an international comparison of the speed of 
adjustment and document that the speed with which firms converge toward their target 
leverage level varies substantially across countries (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008; González and 
González, 2008; Wanzenried, 2006). Ö ztekin and Flannery (2012) argue that an economy’s 
legal and financial institutions significantly influence the speed of adjustment based on 
distinct costs or benefits associated with the adjustment process. Furthermore, they document 
that, on average, firms located in market-based countries display much more rapid adjustment 
than those in bank-based countries (annually by 19% and 3%, respectively). They argue that 
their results “suggest that a market-based structure imposes lower costs of adjusting or higher 
benefits of converging to a firm’s optimal capital ratio, or both” (p. 103). 
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2.2. Countries’ Financial Orientations 
Conventional thinking holds that, in bank-based financial systems, banks provide most of 
the capital for firms while, in market-based systems, firms raise funds on capital markets 
(Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). Bank-based countries are characterized by having banking 
systems that are relatively more developed than their stock market. The opposite is the case in 
market-based economies, in which stock markets are larger and more liquid in comparison to 
the bank-based countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002).  
Because of the diverse research findings and the rapid development of stock markets
7
 in 
many of the traditionally bank-based countries over the past three decades (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2003), many scholars claim that the traditional differentiation between economies as 
being bank based or market based is inaccurate or inappropriate (e.g., Kwok and Tadesse, 
2006; Purda, 2008; Tadesse, 2006). Rajan and Zingales (2003) report that in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, stock markets in many countries regarded as bank based 
expanded by more than 13-fold in terms of market capitalization, and equity financing grew 
more than 16-fold. During the same period, the corresponding growth in the U.S. and the U.K. 
(market-based countries) market capitalization was approximately fourfold. Thus the 
traditional breakdown of countries into bank based and market based might be too simplistic 
in today’s world.  
In light of this, we adopt an alternative way of capturing the orientation of a country’s 
financial system by using the financial architecture (FINARCH) variable developed and used 
by Kwok and Tadesse (2006), Levine (2002), and Tadesse (2006). In a nutshell, the variable 
FINARCH is an index of the degree of stock market orientation in a country arrived at by 
comparing the size, activity, and efficiency of a stock market to those of a banking system in 
an economy. A more market-oriented financial system (represented by higher values of the 
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 See also Ramos (2009) for an analysis of the development of 101 stock markets from 1975 to 2013. 
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variable FINARCH) should make equity financing cheaper and more readily available for 
companies.  
2.3. Capital Structure and Credit Ratings 
Credit rating agencies provide information about financial instruments and their issuers in 
the form of credit ratings corresponding to the assessed creditworthiness of the issuing body. 
Consequently, credit ratings can be seen as a proxy for the probability of a firm’s default and 
enable investors to value the financial instruments and set the required yield on them 
according to their default risk.  
Graham and Harvey (2001), through a survey carried out on CFOs at US firms, document 
that a credit rating level is the second-most-important factor (nearly on par with the most 
important factor, financial flexibility) in financing decisions. Bancel and Mittoo (2004), in 
their survey of managers at European companies, find that credit ratings have an even 
stronger effect on financing decisions. Servaes and Tufano (2006), in their international 
survey on 334 firms, establish that, from the perspective of CFOs, preserving the current 
credit rating level is the most important (out of 20 factors) in determining a company’s level 
of debt. Leary and Roberts (2005) divide their sample into two portfolios: companies with 
above and below speculative-grade credit ratings. Their results show a negative association 
between investment-grade credit ratings and debt issuance. Using a U.K. sample of 16,000 
manufacturing firms, Bougheas et al. (2006) find a negative relation between credit ratings 
and both short-term and total debt levels.  
Kisgen (2006) argues that companies expecting changes in their credit rating tend to issue 
equity, instead of bonds, in order to avoid the extra cost of a rating downgrade or to capitalize 
on an upgrade later. In addition, he claims that different credit ratings carry discrete costs and 
benefits that can outweigh the costs and benefits of debt financing proposed by the trade-off 
theory. Kisgen (2009) documents that downgraded firms reduce their leverage and adjust 
11 
 
significantly more rapidly to achieve their target level of leverage. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
observe a significant negative impact on the ratio of total debt to market assets if a firm has 
debt with an investment-grade rating. Tang (2009) shows that firms with an upgraded credit 
rating gain better access to the credit market. Hence, they react by increasing debt financing 
relative to equity financing. Mittoo and Zhang (2010) argue that, through simply having credit 
ratings, firms gain access to the bond market. They assert that highly rated firms care about 
their credit rating more than low-rated firms. This explains why, despite having access to 
bond markets, firms with a good credit rating issue substantially less debt than their poorly 
rated counterparts. Byoun (2011) argues that credit ratings and leverage ratios have a negative 
relationship because of the different demands for financial flexibility.  
Faulkender et al. (2012) use bond ratings to distinguish between financially constrained 
(without bond credit ratings) and unconstrained companies (with bond credit ratings). They 
find that overlevered companies with credit ratings adjust substantially more slowly to a target 
level than nonrated firms, whereas rated firms that are underlevered adjust substantially more 
quickly than their nonrated counterparts. They argue that, on the one hand, overlevered firms 
with credit ratings are less concerned about excessive debt because they can access financial 
markets more easily.  On the other hand, rated firms that are underlevered benefit more from 
increasing their leverage to achieve their target level.  Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) 
find evidence that credit rating agencies became more conservative when assigning bond 
ratings over time (1985-2009). Stricter ratings make US firms more likely to reduce their 
leverage, less likely to ask for a debt rating, and less likely to hold large amounts of cash. 
Using a cross-country sample, Huang and Shen (2015) argue that downgraded and upgraded 
firms react by adjusting their capital structure in a way documented by Kisgen (2009). In 
addition, they find evidence that firms adjust their leverage more quickly “in countries with 
better financial development and strong legal and institutional environments than in weak 
12 
 
ones, regardless of the upgraded and downgraded rating changes” (p. 277). 
 A large body of literature investigates two kinds of debt heterogeneity in capital structure 
that occurs at firms with different credit ratings. In his seminal papers, Diamond (1991a, 1993) 
proposes a non-monotonic relation between firms’ credit quality and debt maturity. In his 
model, firms with the highest and lowest credit ratings use mainly short-term debt, whereas 
“middle-rated” firms use mainly long-term debt. Diamond’s model was later supported by 
empirical evidence in Barclay and Smith (1995) and Bougheas et al. (2006).
8
  
 Another source of heterogeneity determined by firms’ credit ratings relates to the source 
of debt. Diamond (1991b) asserts that highly rated companies tend to issue directly placed 
debt (e.g., commercial paper), whereas medium-rated companies tend to borrow from banks. 
His findings were confirmed by Stohs and Mauer (1996), who investigate the distribution of 
various types of debt contract across firms with different credit ratings. Denis and Mihov 
(2003) document that firms with the highest, medium, and the lowest credit ratings borrow 
mainly from public sources, banks, and nonbank private lenders, respectively. For example, 
they estimate that firms with an investment-grade credit rating are 60% more likely to issue 
public debt than firms with non–investment-grade ratings. They assert that this causal relation 
stems from different levels of information asymmetry and borrowers’ reputation conveyed to 
markets by credit ratings. In their recent study, Rauh and Sufi (2010) argue that highly rated 
firms rely on senior unsecured debt and equity; however, poorly rated firms rely on secured 
bank loans and subordinated debt. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Hypotheses development 
 We propose three hypotheses related to the impact of credit rating levels on capital 
                                                     
8
 Another association between credit ratings and heterogeneity in the maturity structure of firm debt can be 
derived from managerial optimism (Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013; Landier and Thesmar, 2009). Jung and 
Subramanian (2013) find strong empirical evidence and argue that “long-term debt declines with optimism, 
whereas short-term borrowing increases” (p. 1617). It is easy to argue that a credit rating upgrade is a purely 
positive event from a manager’s perspective. 
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structure and its adjustment speed. According to Tang (2009), higher credit ratings provide 
firms with lower borrowing costs and better access to debt markets, and therefore their 
leverage ratios should go up. This is, however, inconsistent with the evidence of de Jong, 
Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2012) that, in order to preserve their investment-grade credit 
ratings and financial flexibility, firms remain underlevered to preserve their debt capacity for 
difficult periods.  
 Existing studies document that a credit rating reduces the problem of information 
asymmetry. Frank and Goyal (2009) and Liu and Malatesta (2005) argue that, by signaling 
firms’ higher value, better credit ratings lower information asymmetry between firms’ 
managers and investors, which, in turn, decreases the cost of equity financing. Gomes and 
Phillips (2012) document that the greater the asymmetric information, the lower the 
probability of issuing equity and the higher the probability of issuing debt. Rauh and Sufi 
(2010) document that the better the firms’ credit rating, the more firms rely on an equity form 
of capital; poorly rated firms use more secured loans and subordinated debt. Additionally, 
companies with better ratings use excess cash to pay back existing debt rather than repurchase 
equity (Myers, 1984), which leads to a lower debt-equity ratio. To sum up, highly rated firms 
become conservative in the use of debt financing, and firms tend to use equity, rather than 
debt, if they have a better credit rating. This leads us to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: A better credit rating has a negative effect on a firm’s leverage ratio. 
The existing literature shows that a firm’s speed of adjustment to achieve its target level 
of leverage depends on the costs and benefits
9
 of such an adjustment (e.g., Ö ztekin and 
Flannery, 2012). Kisgen (2006) claims that credit ratings per se impose discrete costs and 
benefits that can dominate the costs and benefits of debt financing proposed by the trade-off 
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 One example of adjustment costs is transaction costs from issuing/repurchasing debt and equity incurred by a 
firm when it converges to its desired leverage ratio. Adjustment costs can impede the realization of target capital 




theory. This, in turn, explains why high-quality companies are underlevered from the 
perspective of both the trade-off theory and the pecking-order theory and poor-quality firms 
tend to be overlevered. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) document that financially unconstrained, 
highly rated firms are more likely to deviate from their target leverage ratios in an attempt to 
time the markets by issuing/repurchasing securities when macroeconomic conditions are most 
favorable. Similarly, de Jong et al. (2012) find that firms with an investment-grade credit 
rating remain underlevered and issue debt when the time is right or when necessary (i.e., 
during constrained times).  
The adjustment speed also differs in highly rated (or underlevered) and poorly rated (or 
overlevered) firms. Kisgen (2009) argues that downgraded, overlevered firms strive to 
diminish their leverage and effectively converge at their target levels significantly more 
rapidly. Faulkender et al. (2012) and Hovakimian (2004) find evidence that, in general, 
overleveraged firms display significantly more rapid adjustment than their underlevered peers. 
Faulkender et al. (2012) persuasively argue that “Under-levered firms forego tax benefits of 
leverage and have little concern with financial distress costs. Yet potential financial distress 
costs loom quite large for over-levered firms” (p. 636). Korteweg (2010)’s results show that, 
as firms drift below their optimal leverage ratio, their value goes down much more slowly 
than is the case for firms that drift above their optimal leverage ratio. In their international 
survey, Servaes and Tufano (2006) document that 60% of 334 firms’ CFOs restrain 
themselves from increasing their leverage out of fear of being downgraded. This finding 
indicates that firms with good ratings do not add more debt even if they are underlevered in 
order not to lose their high ratings. Following H1 and previous studies, we expect that highly 
rated (investment-grade), underlevered firms are less likely to adjust leverage and slower to 




Hypothesis 2: Firms with a high credit rating (investment-grade) adjust to achieve their 
optimal debt-equity ratio more slowly than firms with a poor credit rating 
(speculative-grade). 
 
Traditionally, in bank-oriented countries the banking industry supplies the majority of 
credit to firms (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000). Ties between companies and the banking 
sector, such as loan commitments, are stronger than in market-oriented countries (Mishkin, 
2005). Because of the close long-term relationship between lenders and the borrowing firms, 
banks enjoy the advantages of inside monitoring. Improved monitoring decreases information 
asymmetry, allowing banks to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower using their own 
internal credit ratings or some other credit scoring system, without needing external credit 
ratings. Companies that operate in market-based countries do not have such a close 
relationship with banks and may suffer from a greater degree of information asymmetry. A 
credit rating agency can bridge this gap by providing credit ratings. Thus, we expect the 
effects of credit ratings on capital structure decisions to be more significant in a market-based 
financial system than in a bank-based financial system. 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of a credit rating on a firm’s capital structure is more significant in 
countries with a more market-oriented financial system. 
 
3.2. Sample and Data Sources 
To test our hypotheses in an international context, we start with all available firms listed 
in Compustat (North American and Global). Our final sample is obtained from a thorough 
selection process, and each sample firm must meet the following conditions. First, all sample 
firms must have a long-term issuer credit rating from Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and they must 
be listed on a major stock exchange in their country. Second, following the sampling 
procedures used in prior research, all firms must have a leverage ratio of less than 1 (Huang 
and Ritter, 2009) and a market-to-book ratio between 0 and 10 (Leary and Roberts, 2005). 
16 
 
Each firm is represented by at least three consecutive annual observations
10
 in the sample and 
has no missing variables. Third, financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are omitted from 
the sample, as the nature of financial firms’ liabilities are significantly different from those of 
nonfinancial entities. Similar to de Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008), we retain in our sample 
only the countries with the highest number of observations rated by S&P so as to obtain at 
least 50 annual observations from each country. The final sample consists of 19 countries 
(economies) and 17,102
11
 firm-year observations from 1991 to 2010. To our knowledge, this 
sample is much more comprehensive than is the case in previous international credit rating 
studies (Huang and Shen, 2015). 
Table 1 presents the number of firms and firm-year observations in each country. As 
expected, the United States has the largest number of firms and firm-year observations, 
followed by Japan. These two countries are viewed as representative of market-based and 
bank-based financial systems (e.g., Antoniou et al., 2008). We further classify the sample 
countries according to the traditional division of market-based and bank-based countries 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002) and with respect to the alternative financial 
architecture approach (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006; Levine, 2002; Tadesse, 2006).  
Importantly, four countries (Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Thailand), which were 
traditionally deemed market based, are qualified as FINARCH(Low). Similarly, two countries 
(India and Russia) there were deemed bank based and belong to the FINARCH(High) group. 
These observations are consistent with studies claiming that the traditional breakdown of 
countries as either market-based and bank-based is too simplistic and does not reflect current 
economic conditions. 
[Table 1 here] 
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 A minimum of three consecutive annual observations are required to conduct the GMM procedure (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). 
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3.3. Explanations of Variables 
Like prior research (Antoniou et al., 2008; Leary and Roberts, 2005), we use the ratio of 
long-term leverage to the market value of total assets (MLLEV) as the main dependent 
variable.
12
 Frank and Goyal (2009) identify six core determinants of the market leverage ratio. 
In our study, we use all six factors: profitability (EBIT/TA), growth opportunities (MTB), 
relative tangible assets (TANG/TA), firm size (SIZE), median industry leverage (MEDLEV), 
and annual inflation rate (INFL). In addition, we control for countries’ economic development 
using gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (GDPPC) as a proxy. To diminish the 
influence of outliers, all firm-specific factors are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
(Faulkender et al., 2012). Appendix A lists all the variables, their definitions, and data 
sources.   
We measure the credit rating variable (RATING) by coding all S&P’s long-term domestic 
issuer credit ratings letter grades in terms of 22 ordinal numerical values (from 1 to 22).
13
 
Table 2 lists the frequency and its associated percentage of the issuer credit ratings in our 
sample using the S&P rating category along with our corresponding coding system. The 
results indicate that around 50% of credit ratings are concentrated in the categories of BBB 
and BB. In addition, we divide the sample based on the classifications of investment grade 
and non-investment grade. INVESTDUM is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm has an 
investment-grade credit rating (BBB- or above) and 0 otherwise (BB+ and below). We 
explore whether the relationship between credit rating level and capital structure differs in the 
investment grade and speculative grade groups.  
[Table 2 here] 
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 We use three additional measures of a firm’s leverage ratio as a robustness check: the ratio of total leverage to 
the market value of total assets (MLEV), the ratio of long-term leverage to the book value of total assets 
(BLLEV), and the ratio of total leverage to the book value of total assets (BLEV). Using these alternative 
measures does not materially change our results. 
13
 Where AAA = 22, AA+ = 21, AA = 20, AA- = 19, A+ = 18, A = 17, A- = 16, BBB+ = 15, BBB = 14, BBB- = 
13, BB+ = 12, BB = 11, BB- = 10, B+ = 9, B = 8, B- = 7, CCC+ = 6, CCC = 5, CCC- = 4, CC = 3, SD = 2, and 
D = 1. This numerical procedure is similar to the coding system used in, for example, Becker and Milbourn 
(2011) and Poon, Lee, and Gup (2009).  
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Because of mixed results in the existing research and the questionable validity of the 
crude market-based/bank-based division of countries, we use the financial architecture 
variable as an alternative to classify a country’s financial orientation, following the literature 
(Aggarwal and Goodell, 2011; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000; Levine, 2002; 
Tadesse, 2006). The financial architecture variable (FINARCH)
14
is the first principal 
component of three indices representing the size, activity, and efficiency of the stock market 
relative to the banking system. The larger the value of the FINARCH variable, the greater the 
market-based financial orientation of a country is. We divide the countries into the 
FINARCH(High) and FINARCH(Low) groups according to the median value of the 
FINARCH variable in the sample. For each year (1991-2010), we use a median of the 
FINARCH variable as a benchmark and compare it to each of the countries’ annual FINARCH 
values. Consequently, a country falls into FINARCH(Low) group if more than 50% (11 years 
or more) of its FINARCH’s annual values are below the total sample FINARCH’s median for 
any of the 20 years (1991-2010). Likewise, a country falls into FINARCH(High) group if 
more than 50% (11 years or more) of its FINARCH’s annual values are below the total sample 
FINARCH’s median for any of the 20 years (1991-2010). Based on the rank of annual median 
values of the financial architecture variable in each economy, ten countries fall into the 
FINARCH(Low) group and nine into the FINARCH(High) group.  
The relevant literature offers four alternative versions of FINARCH variable (Beck et al., 
2000; Tadesse, 2006). To save space, we report the results only by the first version of financial 
architecture variable, which is denoted FINARCH1. The results are virtually unchanged if we 
use other versions of the FINARCH variable. For a detailed explanation of differences among 
four versions of FINARCH, see Appendix B.  
                                                     
14
 Specifically, the size index measures the size of equity markets compared with that of the banking industry in 
each of the countries. The activity index is formed by dividing the total value of shares traded relative to GDP by 
the bank credit ratio. The efficiency index is calculated as the product of the turnover ratio (the ratio of the value 
of total shares traded to average real market capitalization) and a bank’s overhead ratio, which is defined as a 
bank’s overhead costs as a share of its total assets. 
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3.4. Econometric Specification 
We employ dynamic models to test our hypotheses about the relationship between credit 
rating levels and capital structure decisions. Antoniou et al. (2008) argue that, in order to 
obtain a valid dynamic model, which takes into account the possibility of the autoregressive 
process on an error term, a one-period lagged dependent variable is required. We include the 
lagged terms of leverage and credit ratings in the models. Our benchmark model similar to the 
one in Antoniou et al. (2008) is specified in Equation 1. 
+ + 
              (1) 
where is the leverage ratio for firm i in year t, ( ) is a constant term, , 
, and  are the coefficients of the parameters to estimate,  is the first 
lag of the dependent variable (to capture the dynamic aspect of capital structure), and 
 is the credit rating lagged one year. X is a vector of explanatory variables 
composed of k-factors. These factors are as follows: EBIT/TA, MTB, SIZE, TANG/TA, 
MEDLEV, INFL, GDPPC, and FINARCH1. Cj is a dummy variable for a given country 
whereas Yt is a dummy variable for a given year. (  ) represents the time-invariant unobserved 
firm fixed effects (e.g., reputation or management performance) that influence firms’ capital 
structure.  represents the time-specific shocks, which can fluctuate over time and affect 
all the firms in one or more countries (e.g., demand shocks). The error term  has a mean 
equal to zero and constant variance σ2 and does not suffer from serial correlation. We expect 
the coefficient  to be negative, which confirms H1. The speed of leverage adjustment is 
measured by the coefficient .  
We further explore the impact of credit ratings on adjustment speed and the impact of 




+ α3FINARCHjt + 
+α4Ratingi(t-1)*Leveragei(t-1) + α5Ratingi(t-1)*FINARCHjt + 
+ +                 (2)   
    We include the interaction term between the credit rating and the lagged leverage ratio 
and the interaction term between the credit rating and the financial architecture in Equation 2. 
The interaction term between the credit rating and the lagged leverage ratio tests whether the 
impacts of the credit rating on the adjustment speed of leverage differs for different categories 
of credit level. H2 predicts that the coefficient α4 is negative, as poorly rated firms can 
converge toward their target leverage more rapidly than highly rated firms. However, if the 
coefficient of the interaction term between the credit rating and the financial architecture is 
significant, H3 is supported. We expect this coefficient to be negative, as the negative 
correlation between the credit rating and leverage is reinforced in a country with a more 
market-based financial orientation.  
 The problems in the regression models come from two sources of endogeneity: 
unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity. The first source is that unobservable 
heterogeneity causes endogeneity when there are some unobservable determinants (e.g., a 
company’s reputation or management performance) affecting both a dependent variable (here 
firms’ leverage) and its explanatory variable (here a credit rating). The second source is that 
simultaneity arises when the explanatory variable is affected by the dependent variable or its 
lags (credit rating and corporate leverage affecting each other). The endogeneity comes from 
the dynamic nature of credit rating and capital structure decisions. We aim to identify the 
impacts of credit rating on leverage ratios. However, it can be easily argued that, the leverage 
ratio is a key determinant of credit rating when credit rating agencies assign ratings to a firm. 





, and thus the OLS (or fixed-effect) method would yield biased and possibly 
spurious and yet statistically significant results. Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) have 
thoroughly discussed these endogeneity issues arising in the context of governance structure 
and firm performance. 
We put an emphasis on solving the problem of endogeneity between credit ratings and 
firms’ leverage and on identifying causality between credit ratings and firms’ 
leverage/adjustment speed, following the method of dynamic GMM estimator suggested by 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012). They argue that “the dynamic nature of the relation 
between corporate governance and performance actually sets up a powerful methodology for 
identifying the causal effect of governance on performance” (p. 582) and it is possible to use 
past variables from firm’s history as valid “internal” instrumental variables to address the 
simultaneity problem without the need for searching for external instruments.
16
  
    We follow this framework by applying a dynamic GMM approach and using past 
corporate leverage and rating as a set of “internal” instruments which allows us to mitigate 
endogeneity problems and identify the causality between credit rating and capital structure 
decisions. Specifically, our study employs the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which utilizes a system of two equations: 
one in differences (used in the difference GMM estimator
17
) and one in levels. In addition to 
the lagged values of variables used as instruments for their first differences (difference GMM), 
the system GMM estimator uses the lagged first differences as valid (exogenous)
18
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 This endogeneity problem is similar to the discussion of impacts of corporate governance on firm 
performance in Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012). They show that the current value of corporate governance 
variables is a function of past firm performance; the current explanatory variable (governance structure in their 
paper) is a function of past values of dependent variable (firm performance).  
16
 In practice, identifying and justifying a strictly exogenous instrument is very difficult and often not possible. 
17
 The difference GMM estimator takes the first difference of all variables in the equation and uses the lagged 
values of regressors as valid instrumental variables for their first differences. Nevertheless, the difference GMM 
technique suffers from a number of shortcomings (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Most 
importantly, there is a significant sample bias when the autoregressive lagged leverage parameter is highly 
persistent, i.e., close to 1 (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
18
 For a detailed explanation and assumptions under which the system GMM procedure yields a set of valid 
22 
 
instruments for the regressors from the levels equation. Antoniou et al. (2008) argue for the 
superiority of the two-step system GMM over the one-step system in the case of dynamic 
modeling. Flannery and Hankins (2013) state that, for unbalanced panels of data, the two-step 
system GMM “remains the best option for higher levels of endogeneity if the lagged 
dependent variable is of interest” (p. 13).19 
4.  DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
We present two figures to describe the values of the financial architecture variable and the 
relationships between credit ratings and leverage in the sample countries from 1991 to 2010. 
Figure 1 reports yearly plots of median FINARCH1 values for the different samples. There is 
no surprise with respect to countries typically used as benchmarks for being bank based 
(France, Japan, Germany) and market based (the United States, the U.K.). In fact, as seen in 
Figure 1, the United States and Japan persistently have the highest and the lowest FINARCH1 
values, respectively. In general, the annual medians of FINARCH1 in all four samples 
demonstrate an increasing trend over time in the market orientation of the financial systems in 
the countries investigated, in line with the findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995, 2003). In 
addition, as one would expect, FINARCH1 values tend to drop during crises and increase 
during periods of economic prosperity. In particular, two obvious peaks occurred on the eve of 
the dot-com stock bubble of 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008, followed by substantial and 
prolonged drops. These phenomena are the most visible in the US sample’s plot, followed by 
a sample of countries labeled as FINARCH(High). In sum, there is a large degree of annual 
fluctuation within individual countries and samples as well as substantial cross-country 
differences in financial architecture variables.  
[Figure 1 here] 
                                                                                                                                                                     
exogenous instruments, see Wintoki et al., (2012), in particular pp. 587-589.  
19
 In our research we use a two-step system GMM procedure with orthogonal deviations (we use the application 
xtabond2 by David Roodman [2009] for STATA). 
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Figure 2 shows plots of the median leverage ratios (MLLEV) by the different credit 
ratings. The figure shows that the least-leveraged firms are those with the highest credit 
ratings,
20
 which in turn supports H2. Furthermore, it can be observed that when the credit 
ratings improve, the leverage ratios gradually decrease. The negative relationship between 
credit ratings and the debt ratio is consistent in the full sample and in the groups classified by 
financial orientation. These results are consistent with previously established empirical 
evidence (e.g., Kisgen, 2006; Nishioka and Baba, 2004).
21
 The negative relationship provides 
initial support for H1. Correlation analysis (not tabulated but available from the authors on 
request) also indicates a negative and statistically significant association between credit 
ratings and debt ratios in all samples. It is also interesting to find that the firms in the 
FINARCH(High) group have generally lower debt ratios than firms in the group of 
FINARCH(Low) in the rating categories from D to AA+. The result is natural, as firms in a 
market-based financial system can obtain more equity capital from the stock market than the 
firms in a bank-based financial system, which causes lower debt ratios in the firms in the 
FINARCH(High) group.    
[Figure 2 here] 
4.2. Empirical Results 
4.2.1. Credit Rating and Capital Structure Decision 
We present empirical results estimated from Equation 1 in Table 3. Our main conclusions 
are drawn from the two-step system GMM, as this successfully controls for endogeneity and 
other potential econometric problems mentioned in previous sections. The m1, m2, and 
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 Except for the spike leverage around AA ratings in a plot for Japanese firms, which occurs because of a much 
higher maximum value of leverage in a small number of Japanese firms with ratings ranging from AA- to AA+, 
compared with ratings ranging from BBB+ to A+ and AAA. One explanation could be linked with a number of 
firms recognized by S&P as having a very close relationship with their banks (keiretsu), and thus this debt was 
not as dangerous in terms of possible default as otherwise might have been the case. In addition, there has been a 
long-lasting controversy over credit ratings assigned by the US-based rating agencies to Japanese firms (e.g., 
Behr and Güttler, 2008; Fairchild and Shin, 2006; Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto, 2000; Packer and Reynolds, 
1997). Our “spike” somehow fits into the existing Japanese “credit ratings controversy,” and it remains an open 
empirical question worth investigating in the future. 
21





 all indicate that two-step system GMM is correctly specified for all samples.  
 [Table 3 here] 
The results for the credit rating variable shown in Table 3 are robust and provide support 
for H1. There is a negative and statistically significant relation between credit ratings and 
firms’ debt-equity ratios for the full and FINARCH(High) samples (columns 1 and 2, 
respectively). In the full sample, the coefficient is -0.0041, which is significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient means that a credit rating upgrade of four notches (e.g., from A to AA+) in 
year t will lead to a drop of 4 x 0.41%, i.e., 1.64%, in a company’s debt-to-equity ratio one 
year later, all else being equal. For the FINARCH(High) sample, the coefficient on 
RATINGL1 is -0.0042 and significant at the 1% level. This evidence is consistent with the 
negative and significant correlations described earlier, as well as the results shown in Figure 2. 
The coefficient in column 3 (FINARCH(Low) sample) is negative (but with a smaller value 
than those in columns 1 and 2) and lacks statistical significance. The impact of credit ratings 
on capital structure is not significant in the countries with strong bank-firm ties, which is 
consistent with H2. 
Our findings seem to contradict the argument of the trade-off theory that highly rated 
firms with a good market reputation should enjoy easier access to cheap debt and increase 
their leverage. This prediction, however, is belied by the evidence. First, a credit rating is not 
the only determinant of how expensive it is for a firm to issue debt. Kisgen (2006) argues that 
managers will not behave in the manner predicted by the trade-off theory when the costs and 
benefits of credit ratings assigned to a firm outweigh those of increased leverage. His 
proposition finds confirmation in other empirical studies (e.g., Shivdasani and Zenner, 2005) 
and surveys (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Servaes and Tufano, 2006). 
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 Untabulated estimates from OLS and fixed effects are used as robustness results. The LAGLEV coefficients in 
Table 3 are in between those from the OLS and fixed-effects regressions, which is where they should be 
(Roodman, 2009). The tests for the first- (m1) and second- (m2) order correlations test the null hypotheses of no 
first- or second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. The Hansen test of 
overidentification tests the null hypothesis of the validity of instrumental variables used in the model. 
25 
 
Furthermore, instead of increasing their leverage ratios, firms take advantage of improved 
credit ratings by restructuring their borrowing in terms of its maturity (Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Bougheas et al., 2006; Diamond, 1991a, 1993) and source (e.g., Denis and Mihov, 2003; 
Diamond, 1991b; Rauh and Sufi, 2010; Stohs and Mauer, 1996) and by issuing new equity. 
Highly rated firms are less opaque in the eyes of investors (Livingston, Naranjo, and Zhou, 
2007). Less opacity leads to lower information asymmetry and adverse selection, thereby 
decreasing the cost of equity financing (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009; Liu and Malatesta, 
2005), and increasing the probability of issuing equity (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002; Dittmar and Thakor, 2007; Gomes and Phillips, 2012; Marsh, 1982). Rauh 
and Sufi (2010) find that the better the firm’s credit rating is, the larger the share of equity in 
its capital structure. Therefore, negative and statistically significant coefficients in columns 1 
and 2 on RATINGL1 are consistent with the above-mentioned studies. 
Table 3 indicates positive and statistically significant coefficients for LAGLEV
23
 
regardless of a country’s financial orientation and economic development. This result is 
consistent with the findings of González and González (2008) and others. The coefficients are 
between 0 and 1, which is consistent with leverage converging to desired levels (Antoniou et 
al., 2008). In Table 3, the coefficients on the lagged leverage ratio indicate slower adjustment 
for the less-market-based financial orientation sample (column 3).
24
 The coefficient in 
column 3 (0.7015) implies that, on average, rated firms based in countries that are less 
market-oriented close almost 30% (1 – 0.7015) of the gap between their actual and target 
leverage within one year. At this speed, it takes about two years
25
 to close half the gap 
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 In accordance with the recent studies, the results are based on the ratio of long-term leverage to the market 
value of total assets (MLLEV). All estimates were also conducted using three alternative proxies for leverage 
ratios (the results are available from the authors on request). 
24
 Interestingly, the coefficient on LAGLEV in column 1 is below those from the two subsamples. One 
explanation of this fact could be linked to the results being more driven by the large number of US-based firms in 
a smaller FINARCH(High) sample than in the full sample. In untabulated regressions for the US-based firms only, 
the coefficient for LAGLEV is approximately 0.66. We have taken precautionary measures to ensure that our 
results are robust with respect to a potential overrepresentation bias (see Section 5.6). 
25
 This calculation is simply ln(0.5)/ln(1 – 0.2985) (e.g., Ö ztekin and Flannery, 2012). 
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between the current and target levels of debt. Likewise, firms based in countries with highly 
market-based financial systems (column 2) converge toward their desired leverage by 
approximately 36.5% a year. This evidence indicates that firms in a more market-based 
environment are characterized by lower costs of adjustment or larger benefits of convergence 
toward the optimal leverage ratio (or both) than firms in a more bank-based environment 
(FINARCH(Low) sample is used as a proxy).
26
 Like the results in research such as Flannery 
and Rangan (2006), our estimates suggest that, in all samples, the target market debt ratios are 
of pivotal importance for companies. 
4.2.2. Credit Rating, Adjustment Speed, and Financial Architecture 
Table 4 shows the results estimated from Equation 2, in which we include two interaction 
variables (RATINGL1*FINARCH1 and RATINGL1*LAGLEV), used to test the validity of H2 
and H3. In column 3, we reintroduce both significant interactions simultaneously as 
robustness measures. 
[Table 4 here] 
The reported coefficients of the interaction variable RATINGL1*LAGLEV are positive 
and significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that the lower the credit rating is, the 
faster the adjustment. The estimate on RATINGL1*LAGLEV in column 1 (0.0109) means that 
a company with an AA credit rating closes over 1% less of the gap between its actual and 
target leverage within one year than its counterpart with an AA- credit rating. In a similar vein, 
the difference in the speed of adjustment between the firms with the highest and the lowest 
investment-grade credit rating (AAA versus BBB-) can be as much as 10%. The coefficients 
on the RATINGL1*LAGLEV variable are consistent with Kisgen’s (2009) results, which 
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 Antoniou et al. (2008) document similar divergence in the speed of adjustment and argue that, because of the 
strong ties and close long-term relations between companies and creditors (banks) in bank-based economies, the 
cost of being away from the optimal capital structure is lower than the cost of adjustment. Therefore, firms can 
adjust slowly toward their desired level of leverage. Moreover, unlike their peers in market-based countries, 
firms in bank-based countries depend less on the signaling mechanism of debt to demonstrate their quality to 
investors in equity or bond markets. 
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focused on the US market and showed that downgraded firms adjust significantly more 
rapidly toward their target levels of leverage. However, our results focus on credit rating 
levels instead of rating changes, and they confirm H2. 
The finding that poorly rated firms have more rapid adjustment than highly rated firms is 
in line with the existing literature. First, overlevered or poorly rated firms face increasingly 
higher costs
27
 while deviating above and farther away from their target levels of leverage 
than highly rated or underlevered firms deviating below their target levels (Faulkender et al., 
2012; Hovakimian, 2004). On the one hand, poor credit ratings magnify the costs of being 
distant from the target leverage. On the other hand, the benefits of high credit ratings diminish 
or even outweigh (Kisgen, 2006) these costs. Second, Servaes and Tufano (2006) find that 
CFOs (60% of those surveyed), for fear of losing a credit rating, do not add more debt to 
firms’ capital structure. This suggests that, despite being underlevered, firms with good 
ratings do not increase their leverage.
28
 Third, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) document that 
financially unconstrained firms with good ratings are more likely to deviate from their target 
leverage ratio in an attempt to time the market by issuing/repurchasing securities when 
macroeconomic conditions are most favorable. Moreover, de Jong et al. (2012) argue that 
instead of adjusting their capital structure and issuing cheaper debt, firms with an 
investment-grade credit rating remain underlevered so as to preserve the capacity to raise debt 
in the future, which leads to a slow adjustment speed.  
Table 4 also tests H3 with respect to the relationship between the credit rating and the 
capital structure in countries with different financial orientations. The coefficients for 
RATINGL1*FINARCH1 provide strong support for H3—that is, they have negative signs 
(-0.0010) and are statistically significant at the 1% level in both columns 2 and 3. These 
results confirm a higher dependence of the capital structure on credit ratings when companies 
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 E.g., increasing bankruptcy costs, which lead to higher costs of both debt and equity financing. 
28
 Figure 2 offers initial support for this rationale. 
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operate in an environment with more developed stock markets (those with higher FINARCH1 
scores). The finding is also consistent with the results in Table 3, which indicate that the 
relationship between credit ratings and the capital structure is more significant in the 
FINARCH(High) group sample. Conventional thinking holds that corporate leverage is higher 
in bank-based countries and that the creditworthiness of a firm is assessed by banks without 
much need for an externally provided credit rating. We further show that the financial 
orientation of a country can also influence the magnitude of a credit rating’s impact on 
debt-equity ratios. This argument has not been explored in the existing literature.  
5.  ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
5.1. Speeds of Adjustment across Different Rating Classes 
 In Table 5, motivated by Kisgen (2006, 2009), and their argument that credit ratings 
carry additional costs and benefits, which can outweigh the costs and benefits of adjusting 
toward target leverage levels, we divide the previously estimated samples into two 
subsamples (firms with investment-grade credit ratings versus firms with speculative-grade 
credit ratings). The results are consistent with those in Table 4. An initial inspection of results 
suggests that all three samples
29
 show a stark disparity in the speed of adjustment between 
investment-rated and speculative-rated firms. For example, in the FINARCH(High) sample, 
companies with speculative-grade credit ratings (column 3) close about 37% of the gap 
between their actual and target debt ratios within one year, implying that it takes 18 months
30
 
to close half the gap between firms’ desired and current leverage ratios. Likewise, 
investment-grade firms reduce the gap between their actual and target debt ratio within one 
year by 28% and need 25 months to close half the gap. In other words, firms with 
below-investment-grade credit ratings close approximately 9% more of the gap annually, and 
they need a seven-month-shorter period to close half the distance between the 
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 The three samples are All countries (columns 1-2), FINARCH(High) (columns 3-4), and FINARCH(Low) 
(columns 5-6). 
30
 This calculation is simply ln(0.5)/ln(1 – 0.3706). 
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above-mentioned debt ratios. However, after conducting pairwise statistical tests of 
difference
31
 between the LAGLEV coefficients for highly rated versus poorly rated firms in 
each of the three samples, it becomes clear that the above-mentioned difference in the speed 
of adjustment is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels for firms in the 
FINARCH(High) and All countries samples, respectively. This coincides with H2 and the 
expected greater significance of credit ratings in more market-oriented financial 
macro-environments. In sum, the estimates from Table 5 offer additional support for H2 and 
H3. 
[Table 5 here] 
5.2. Tests of H2 and H3 using the INVESTDUM Variable and Its Interaction Terms 
 Previous credit rating literature has shown significant differences between the behaviors 
at firms with investment-grade and speculative–grade credit ratings assigned. Instead of using 
the interaction terms with the RATING variable in Equation 2, we create interaction terms 
with the dummy variable INVESTDUM. If the claims from H2 and H3 are correct, the 
coefficients on the interaction variables should be statistically significant and carry the 
expected signs. Table 6 shows the results of the robustness tests that confirm the results of H2 
and H3. The coefficients on INVESTDUM*LAGLEV and INVESTDUM*FINARCH1 in Table 
6 are highly statistically significant at the 1% level with the expected signs. Therefore, Table 6 
offers robust support for H2 and H3. 
 [Table 6 here] 
5.3. Rating Agencies’ Increased Conservatism over Time 
In their empirical work, Baghai et al. (2014) find evidence that “Rating agencies have 
become more conservative in assigning corporate credit ratings over the period 1985 to 2009” 
(p. 1961). They argue that this increased conservatism makes firms less leveraged, less likely 
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 The authors thank the anonymous referee from the European Journal of Finance for suggesting this approach. 
The calculations are not presented in the paper, but are available from the authors on request. 
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to seek bond credit ratings and keep more cash on their balance sheets. In order to capture the 
above-mentioned phenomena, we replicate their method and create two proxies for rating 
conservatism: the variables RAT_DIFF_IND and RAT_DIFF_FIRM.
32
 In addition to first lags 
of these two measures of rating conservatism (added into our model one at a time), we 
incorporate the variable CASH/ASSETS
33
 into our base model (equation 1). 
The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 which offer further support for 
our previous findings in terms of their robustness. In addition, in line with Baghai et al. 
(2014), we also find evidence for increased conservatism in S&P’s issuer credit ratings in an 
international sample. The coefficients of both RAT_DIFF_INDL1 and RAT_DIFF_FIRML1 
are positive
34
 and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on the variable 
CASH/ASSETS has a negative sign and is highly statistically significant, confirming results in 
the previous literature (e.g., Devos, Dhillon, Jagannathan, and Krishnamurthy, 2012), and 
supports the robustness of our main results/tests. 
[Table 7 here] 
5.4. Credit Rating Changes 
In his seminal paper, Kisgen (2009) documents that firms operating in the United States 
adjust their capital structure in reaction to negative changes in their credit rating by reducing 
their leverage after being downgraded. In addition, he finds that firms’ reaction to upgrades is 
much weaker, in both economic and statistical senses. Huang and Shen (2015), in their 
international study, support Kisgen’s (2009) findings. In order to test for the robustness of our 
main results, we include one-period lags of two credit rating change dummy variables 
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 The equation for rating conservatism they use is as follows: RAT_DIFF i,t = Actual Ratingi,t − Predicted 
Ratingi,t. For more detailed explanations of these two variables, see Appendix A or Baghai et al. (2014). 
33
 In an unreported series of regressions, we try nine alternative cash ratios. The results remain robust and 
unchanged. 
34
 Both coefficients for rating conservatism in our study have opposite signs (i.e., positive) from those in Baghai 
et al. (2014). This is caused by our method of assigning numerical values to S&P’s credit ratings. Baghai et al. 
(2014) use 1 = AAA to 21 = C (p. 1965) while we use 22 = AAA to 1 = D. Therefore, in Baghai et al. (2014) 
negative coefficients on RAT_DIFF_INDL1 and RAT_DIFF_FIRML1 variable imply conservatism, whereas in 
our results, positive coefficients imply conservatism. 
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(UPGRADEL1 and DOWNGRADEL1) in our base model (equation 1).  The results that are 
presented in Table 7 (column 3) are consistent with previous studies (Huang and Shen, 2015; 
Kisgen, 2009). Furthermore, they do not alter our main findings, that is, the coefficient on 
RATINGL1 remains negative and statistically significant. 
5.5. Near the Borders Credit Ratings 
Following Kisgen (2006), we test whether firms with plus, minus, and plus or minus 
ratings assigned decrease their leverage. We do so to verify whether our variable RATINGL1 
accurately captures the effect of credit rating levels on firms’ capital structure. If that is the 
case, three dummy variables
35
 added to our base model (equation 1) should not alter our 
results (in particular: the sign, magnitude, and significance of the RATINGL1 variable). Again, 
the main results are virtually unchanged,
36
 which further support our main findings and 
suggests that the variable RATINGL1 captures the effect of credit ratings on firms leveraging 
policies and that credit ratings levels are important irrespective of plus or minus refinement. 
In other words, firms are generally concerned with their credit ratings per se (e.g., whether the 




 We conduct a battery of sensitivity tests to further check the robustness of our results. 
Instead of using FINARCH1 as a measure of the financial orientation of a country, we use 
three alternative measures of financial architecture (see Appendix B). We find that the 
estimated results are virtually the same. The United States (Japan) has been traditionally used 
as a benchmark for a market-based (bank-based) economy. In addition, the United States has 
the highest (Japan the lowest) FINARCH1 values documented in our paper. For these reasons, 
                                                     
35
 As in Kisgen (2006), we create three dummy variables such that “CRPlus = dummy variable (equal to 1) for 
firms that have a plus credit rating at the beginning of the period, as described above. CRMinus = dummy 
variable for firms that have a minus credit rating at the beginning of the period, as described above. CRPOM = 
CRPlus + CRMinus = dummy variable for firms that have a minus or plus credit rating at the beginning of the 
period, as described above” (Kisgen, 2006, p. 1048). 
36
 For brevity, those results are not tabulated, but are available from the authors on request. 
37
 Detailed results are available from the authors on request. 
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we rerun our analyses separately for the United States and Japan. The results once again 
support all three hypotheses. Moreover, we rerun our analyses after removing US and 
Japanese firms from the sample (to eliminate the overrepresentation bias). Our results still 
hold, although statistical significances decline. We also add interaction terms RATINGL1*US 
and RATINGL1*JAPAN to the model and find support for all three hypotheses. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Until recently, the impact of credit ratings on capital structure across countries has been 
relatively neglected. Our paper extends prior research by investigating the role of credit 
ratings on firms’ capital structures and their speed of adjustment toward target debt levels in 
19 countries with different financial orientations. Unlike the previous literature, we 
successfully tackled a serious problem of endogeneity occurring between the credit ratings 
and firms’ leverage by employing the two-step system GMM econometric procedure. 
We find that the impact of credit ratings on capital structure is negative and more 
significant in countries with more market-based financial systems, measured by the financial 
architecture variable. The negative relationship between credit ratings and leverage ratios can 
be associated with material costs and benefits of credit ratings for firms (in particular with 
respect to the highest ratings) and asymmetric information. Companies with a better credit 
rating may become more conservative about using debt financing and enjoy easier access to 
equity financing than those with a poor credit rating. Thus, they issue more equity and less 
debt, which leads to a lower leverage ratio. We also find that the more developed the equity 
market is, the more significant this effect is. Cross-country analysis provides further support 
for the negative relation as highly rated firms in a market-based financial system are more 
likely to obtain equity financing from the market.  
Our results also indicate that in countries that have a more market-oriented financial 
system, firms with a poorer credit rating exhibit significantly (both economically and 
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statistically) more rapid adjustment toward their target debt level than firms with a higher 
credit rating. This evidence supports our hypothesis that credit ratings have greater 
importance for firms in economies with more a market-based financial architecture. This 
finding is consistent with Huang and Shen (2015) and Kisgen (2006) that downgraded firms 
adjust their capital structure more rapidly than upgraded firms, especially in countries with 
strong governance. However, our study explores the adjustment speed of firms with different 
rating levels in addition to rating changes.  
This study is not free from limitations with respect to the measurement of firms’ leverage 
and its components
38
. First, we do not distinguish between public and private debts. The 
firms' choices with respect to private versus public debts are determined by other 
firm-specific factors (including credit ratings as mentioned in Denis and Mihov (2003)) and 
countries’ institutional factors. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to further investigate how 
firms with different credit ratings that are based in countries with different financial 
orientations decide on leverage composition between private and public debts. Second, 
following the traditional method for calculating market leverage ratios (e.g., Antoniou et al., 
2008; Leary and Roberts, 2005), we exclude off-balance sheet debts such as leases.  This 
approach understates firms’ true leverage ratios39 (e.g., Kraft, 2015) and the estimation of the 
adjustment speed of leverage ratio may be biased given such limitation.  Hence, including 
off-balance sheet debts may shed a different light on the relationship between credit ratings 
and firms’ capital structure in the international context. We believe that further studies could 
be conducted in order to examine this important avenue. 
                                                     
38
 The authors thank the anonymous referee from the European Journal of Finance for pointing out the two 
caveats. 
39
 That being the case regardless of whether on-balance sheet debts and off-balance sheet leases work as 
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Sample Countries Grouped by Financial Systems’ Orientation and Economic Development 
This table presents all the countries used in the study with regard to the orientation of their financial system. 
Based on a comparison of annual median values of the FINARCH1 variable in each economy with the total 
sample FINARCH1's annual medians, 10 countries fall into the FINARCH(Low) group and 9 into the 
FINARCH(High) group. For each year (1991-2010) we use a median of the FINARCH1 variable as a benchmark 
and compare it to each of the countries’ annual FINARCH1 values. Consequently, a country falls into 
FINARCH(Low) group if more than 50% (11 years or more) of its FINARCH1’s annual values are below the 
total sample FINARCH1’s median for any of the 20 years (1991-2010). Likewise, a country falls into 
FINARCH(High) group if more than 50% (11 years or more) of its FINARCH1’s annual values are below the 
total sample FINARCH1’s median for any of the 20 years (1991-2010). Eight countries are traditionally 























Australia (Market-Based) 27 323 Canada (Market-Based) 57 598 
India (Bank-Based) 8 53 France (Bank-Based) 40 394 
Hong Kong (Market-Based) 10 86 Germany (Bank-Based) 35 327 
Korea (Market-Based) 19 144 Indonesia (Bank-Based) 13 86 
Russia (Bank-Based) 18 111 Italy (Bank-Based) 16 133 
Sweden (Market-Based) 16 186 Japan (Bank-Based) 240 1,823 
Switzerland (Market-Based) 13 129 Mexico (Market-Based) 16 170 
the U.K. (Market-Based) 53 505 Netherlands (Market-Based) 13 133 
the U.S. (Market-Based) 904 11,729 Spain (Bank-Based) 10 117 
   Thailand (Market-Based) 7 55 















Ordinal Coding System along with S&P’s Rating Scale 
This table summarizes firms’ issuer letter credit ratings used by S&P (column 1) and the corresponding 
numerical equivalents used in our study (column 2). The highest possible rating assigned (AAA) is reserved for 
the firms with “Extremely strong capacity to meet financial commitments” and the lowest possible rating (D) 
means “Payment default on financial commitments” (S&P, 2016). Columns 3 and 4 list frequencies and 
percentages of the overall sample (from 1991 to 2010) for each credit rating category. 
 
Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating 
RATING Ordinal Value 
Assigned 
Frequency in the 
Sample 
% Share in the 
Sample 
AAA 22 244 1.43% 
AA+ 21 104 0.61% 
AA 20 432 2.53% 
AA- 19 711 4.16% 
A+ 18 907 5.30% 
A 17 1,582 9.25% 
A- 16 1,502 8.78% 
BBB+ 15 1,780 10.41% 
BBB 14 2,113 12.36% 
BBB- 13 1,615 9.44% 
BB+ 12 1,059 6.19% 
BB 11 1,302 7.61% 
BB- 10 1,468 8.58% 
B+ 9 1,111 6.50% 
B 8 632 3.70% 
B- 7 318 1.86% 
CCC+ 6 91 0.53% 
CCC 5 39 0.23% 
CCC- 4 12 0.07% 
CC 3 26 0.15% 
SD 2 8 0.05% 
D 1 46 0.27% 
Total 17,102 100% 
 



















Credit Rating Effect on Firms’ Capital Structures 
The dependent variable is the long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, 
heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in parentheses. See Table 1 for a list of countries grouped by 
their financial orientation. See Appendix A for a list of all variables and their definitions. *, **, and *** 
coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In the models, we include the year and 
country dummies, the firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic determinants of leverage (described in Appendix A) 
other than those directly involved in our hypotheses. For the sake of brevity, they are not shown in the table.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 




LAGLEV 0.6331*** 0.6342*** 0.7015*** 
  (32.33) (29.81) (13.61) 
RATINGL1 -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0013 
  (-5.10) (-4.83) (-0.55) 
Industry dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Firms 1,515 1,068 447 
Observations 15,502 12,123 3,379 
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1 (Z-statistic) -11.57*** -10.49*** -7.67*** 
m2 (Z-statistic) 0.52 0.48 0.02 






Tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 Using Interaction Terms 
The dependent variable is the long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, 
heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. See Table 1 for a list of countries grouped 
by their financial orientation. See Appendix A for a list of all variables and their definitions. *, **, and *** 
coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In the models, we include the year and 
country dummies, the firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic determinants of leverage (described in Appendix A) 
other than those directly involved in our hypotheses. For the sake of brevity, they are not shown in the table. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variable Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 All 
 
LAGLEV 0.5142*** 0.6335*** 0.5337*** 
  (10.59) (32.61) (11.34) 
RATINGL1 -0.0063** -0.0045*** -0.0063*** 
  (-6.10) (-6.70) (-6.96) 
FINARCH1 0.0012 0.0132*** 0.0140*** 
  (0.97) (3.61) (3.77) 
RATINGL1* LAGLEV 0.0109*** 
 
0.0094*** 
  (3.02)   (2.70) 
RATINGL1*FINARCH1  -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
   (-3.98) (-4.06) 
Industry dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Firms 1,515 1,515 1,515 
Observations 15,502 15,502 15,502 
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1 (Z-statistic) -12.01*** -11.57***  -11.98*** 
m2 (Z-statistic) 0.53 0.50 0.51 
























Speed of Adjustment for Firms with Investment and Speculative Credit Ratings  
The dependent variable is the long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, 
heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the parentheses. See Table 1 for a list of countries grouped 
by their financial orientation. See Appendix A for a list of all variables and their definitions. *, **, and *** 
coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In the models, we include the year and 
country dummies, the firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic determinants of leverage (described in Appendix A) 
other than those directly involved in our hypotheses. For the sake of brevity, they are not shown in the table. The 
investment-grade (speculative-grade) column reports estimated coefficients for all firms with S&P’s issuer credit 
ratings BBB- or above (BB+ or below). 
 
Independent      
Variable 



























LAGLEV 0.6074*** 0.6851*** 0.6294*** 0.7167*** 0.6366*** 0.7065*** 
  (21.22) (41.27) (20.55) (36.37) (7.66) (15.34) 
FINARCH1 0.0089** -0.0016 0.0096 -0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0055 
  (2.39) (-1.43) (1.57) (-1.34) (-0.24) (-0.67) 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firms 818 1,017 646 647 167 343 
Observations 5,449 10,053 4,546 7,282 881 2,498 
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1 (Z-statistic) -7.74*** -14.73*** -7.25*** -12.95*** -5.51*** -7.49*** 
m2 (Z-statistic) 1.13 -1.02 0.87 0.07 0.31 -1.61 























Robustness Tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 Using the INVESTDUM Variable and Its 
Interactions 
The dependent variable is the long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). 
INVESTDUM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has an investment-grade credit rating (BBB- or above) and 
0 otherwise (BB+ and below). m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. T-statistics based on asymptotic 
standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in the 
parentheses. See Table 1 for a list of countries grouped by their financial orientation. See Appendix A for a list of 
all variables and their definitions. *, **, and *** coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. In the models, we include the year and country dummies, the firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic 
determinants of leverage (described in Appendix A) other than those directly involved in our hypotheses. For the 
sake of brevity, they are not shown in the table. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variable Hypothesis 
2 
Hypothesis    
3 
All  
LAGLEV 0.6435*** 0.6208*** 0.6215*** 
  (34.89) (27.17) (27.00) 
INVESTDUM -0.0269*** -0.0370*** -0.0419*** 
  (-6.78) (-4.89) (-5.84) 
FINARCH1 0.0032* 0.0009 0.0040** 
  (1.87) (0.73) (2.32) 
INVESTDUM*FINARCH1 -0.0052***   -0.0058*** 
  (-3.25)   (-3.50) 
INVESTDUM*LAGLEV   0.0567** 0.0710*** 
    (2.12) (2.63) 
Industry dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Firms 1,515 1,515 1,515 
Observations 15,502 15,502 15,502 
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1 (Z-statistic) -11.67*** -11.81*** -11.88*** 
m2 (Z-statistic) 0.61 0.54 0.53 
















Robustness Tests: Rating Agencies’ Increased Conservatism and Credit Rating Changes 
The dependent variable is the long-term leverage to the market value of total assets ratio (MLLEV). m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. T-statistics based on asymptotic standard errors that are robust to small sample bias, 
heteroskedasticity, and clustered by the firms are in parentheses. See Appendix A for a list of all variables and 
their definitions. *, **, and *** coefficient significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In the 
models, we include the year and country dummies, the firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic determinants of 
leverage (described in Appendix A) other than those directly involved in our hypotheses. For the sake of brevity, 
they are not shown in the table.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 






        
LAGLEV 0.6788*** 0.6669*** 0.6761*** 
  (30.12) (23.26) (34.08) 
RATINGL1 -0.0074*** -0.0140*** -0.0020*** 
  (-4.59) (-3.01) (-2.21)** 
UPGRADEL1   0.0065*** 
    (1.05) 
DOWNGRADEL1   -0.01755*** 
    (-3.09) 
CASH/ASSETS -0.1669*** -0.1771*** 
   (-6.05) (-5.74) 
 RAT_DIFF_INDL1 0.0017**   
   (2.48)   
 RAT_DIFF_FIRML1   0.0096**   
    (2.12)   
Industry dummies Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Firms 1,195 1,195 1,515 
Observations 10,555 10,555 13,903 
Period of Est. 1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2010 
m1 (Z-statistic) -9.78*** -9.74*** -11.28*** 
m2 (Z-statistic) 0.39 0.30 0.60 













Figure 1  
Yearly Plot of Median FINARCH1 Values 
This figure reports yearly plots of median FINARCH1 values for four different samples. Based on the rank of 
annual median values of FINARCH1 variable in each economy, 8 countries (Australia, Hong Kong, India, South 
Korea, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) fall into the FINARCH(High) group, whereas 9 countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Thailand) fall into the 
FINARCH(Low) group. We present separate plots for the United States and Japan. The higher the value of the 






























Long-Term Leverage to the Market Value of Total Assets Ratio (MLLEV) 
by Different Credit Ratings 
This figure shows plots of the dependent variable’s medians (MLLEV) by different credit rating levels. The 
median values of MLLEV and their plots indicate that the least leveraged firms are those with the highest credit 
ratings. Eight countries (Australia, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.) 
fall into the FINARCH(High) group, whereas 9 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Thailand) fall into the FINARCH(Low) group. We present separate plots for the United 







Firm, Industry, and Country Characteristics 
This appendix lists all dependent and independent variables used in the regression analysis. The Name column 
gives the exact names of dependent (MLLEV, MLEV, BLLEV, and BLEV) and independent variables used in the 
econometric modeling process, corresponding to the mentioned characteristics. The Definition column describes 
calculations performed to obtain the variables. The Data Source column provides all the databases from which 
we obtained the variables. 
 
Name Variable Definition Data Source  
Dependent 
variable 
      
MLLEV Long-term leverage 
to the  market value 
of total assets ratio 
Long-term debt/(Book Value of Total 
Assets-Book Value of Equity + Market 
Value of Equity) 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
MLEV Total leverage to the 
market value of total 
assets ratio 
(Long-term debt + Short-term 
debt)/(Book Value of Total Assets-Book 
Value of Equity + Market Value of 
Equity) 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
BLLEV Long-term leverage 
to the book value of 
total assets ratio 
Long-term debt/Book Value of Total 
assets 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
BLEV Total leverage to the 
book value of total 
assets ratio 
(Long-term debt + Short-term 
debt)/Book Value of Total assets 





      
EBIT/TA Profitability ratio Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Book 
Value of Total assets 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
MTB Market-to-book ratio 
(growth 
opportunities) 
(Long-term debt + Short-term Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
Debt + Preferred capital + Market Value 
of Equity)/Book Value of Total assets 
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total annual assets 
measured in the U.S. dollars 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America,       
Datastream 
TANG/TA Relative tangible 
assets 
[Property, Plant and Equipment Total 
(Net)]/Book Value of Total Assets 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
CASH/ASSETS Firm cash holdings Cash and Short-Term Investments/Book 
Value of Total assets 
Compustat Global and 
Compustat North 
America 
RATINGL1 Standard & Poor’s 
domestic long-term  
issuers credit ratings 
lagged one year  
Transformed by assigning ordinal 
values: from 1 for the lowest rating (D), 
to 22 for the highest rating (AAA) 
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             
S&P Global Credit 
Portal 
UPGRADEL1 Credit rating upgrade 
dummy lagged one 
year 
A dummy variable equals to one if the 
firm's credit rating is upgraded and zero 
otherwise. 
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             
S&P Global Ratings 
DOWNGRADEL1 Credit rating 
downgrade dummy 
lagged one year 
A dummy variable equals to one if the 
firm's credit rating is downgraded and 
zero otherwise. 
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,  





Appendix A (continued) 
 
Name Variable Definition Data Source  
Firm  
characteristics 




credit rating dummy 
A dummy variable equal to one if a firm 
has an investment-grade credit rating 
(BBB- or above) and zero otherwise 
(BB+ and below). 
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             




Created by replicating the procedure by 
Baghai et al. (2014) to obtain the 
difference between the actual Standard 
and Poor’s rating and the rating 
predicted based on industry 
fixed effects, i.e., RAT_ DIFF_INDi,t = 
Actual Ratingi,t − Predicted Ratingi,t 
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             
S&P Global Ratings, 





Created by replicating the procedure by 
Baghai et al. (2014) to obtain the 
difference between the actual Standard 
and Poor’s rating and the rating 
predicted based on firm 
fixed effects, i.e., RAT_ DIFF_FIRMi,t 
= Actual Ratingi,t − Predicted Ratingi,t 
Compustat North 
America,                   
OSIRIS,                             
S&P Global Ratings, 
Baghai et al. (2014) 
Industry 
characteristic 
      
MEDLEV Median industry 
leverage 
The median value of MLEV variable by 
SIC code and by year. 
Compustat,                    
EHSO (2012),                       




      
INFL Annual inflation 
rate 
Inflation measured by the consumer 
price index reflects the annual 
percentage change. 





The first principal component of three 
indices measuring the country’s 
financial system orientation based on 
the relative size, activity, and efficiency 
of stock markets vis-à-vis the banking 
sector. The higher is the value of 
FINARCH, the more market-oriented is 
the financial system of a country. 
World Bank (2013) 
           The relative size index: 
[(market capitalization of domestic 
stocks / GDP) / deposit money bank 
assets / GDP)]
World Bank (2013) 
           The relative efficiency index: 
[(total value of shares traded /average 
real market capitalization) * (banking 
overhead costs / banking assets)]
World Bank (2013) 
           The relative activity index: 
[(total value of shares traded / GDP) / 
(claims of the banking sector against the 
private real sector / GDP)]
World Bank (2013) 
GDPPC GDP per capita 
(current US$) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. 






Four Measures of FINARCH Variable 
This Appendix lists the definitions of four alternative measures of the FINARCH variable used in the paper. In 




FINARCH The first principal component of three indices measuring the country’s financial system 
orientation based on the relative size, activity, and efficiency of stock markets vis-à-vis 
the banking sector. The higher is the value of FINARCH, the more market-oriented is 
the financial system of a country. 
The relative size index [(market capitalization of domestic stocks/GDP)/claims of the banking sector against 
the private real sector/GDP)] 
The relative activity index [(total value of shares traded/GDP)/(claims of the banking sector against the private real 
sector/GDP)] 
The relative efficiency index 1 
(FINARCH1) 
 [(total value of shares traded/average real market capitalization) * (banking overhead 
costs/banking assets)] 
The relative efficiency index 2 
(FINARCH2) 
 [(total value of shares traded/GDP) * (banking overhead costs/banking assets)] 
The relative efficiency index 3 
(FINARCH3) 
 [(total value of shares traded/GDP) * (banking net interest revenue/banking 
interest-bearing assets)] 
The relative efficiency index 4 
(FINARCH4) 
 [(total value of shares traded/average real market capitalization) * (banking net interest 
revenue/banking interest-bearing assets)] 
 
Sources: Beck et al. (2000), Tadesse (2006). 
 
 
